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      Jocularity in irony and humor: 
      A cognitive-to-affective process 
                        Shigehiro Haruki
1. Introduction 
This article investigates a common property observed in irony 
and humor, that is, jocularity, and proposes a cognitive ac-
count for how their jocularity comes  out. More specific aims 
are: (i) to show jocularity common to irony and humor, (ii) to 
demonstrate hat the crucial factor for it is the  state- of cogni-
tive discordance between two  (clusters of) inconsistent  assump-
tions, and (iii) to propose that a COGNITIVE-TO-AFFECTIVE 
process plays a crucial role in the two interesting verbal phe-
nomena. 
 There is now a vast amount of literatures on irony and 
humor. Many of them notice that irony and humor have a lot 
in common though it is uncertain whether they have the same 
mechanism in producing and processing. The history of irony 
and humor researches will be deliberately ignored here since 
there is no room for mentioning it sufficiently. Most attentions 
will be cast on jocularity which is supposed to be a  common 
feature in both irony and humor. 
 The structure of this article is as follows. In section 2 and 3 
we will  investigate  irony and humor respectively. These sec-
tions will clearly show the characterisitics of the two phenom-
ena. Section 4 will overview their common feature and provide 
a  .new account for their general interpretation  process in which 
a certain cognitive aspect directly links to an affective aspect.
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2. Irony 
The main objectives of this section are, first, to examine sev-
eral examples of interesting ironies, and second, to indicate a 
fallacy of a traditional  view of irony which is generally ac-
cepted in most irony studies. 
 The traditional view of irony is based on a traditional defini-
tion of irony: irony is a figure of speech whose intended mean-
ing is the opposite of the literal meaning.  Despite, that almost 
all researches have their  own different stand points such as se-
mantic, pragmatic, or cognitive perspectives, many of them ac-
cept the traditional view unconditionally  (Attardo  (2000), 
Giora and Fein  (1999), Grice (1975),  Searle  (1979), Seto (1998) 
and many others). Such studies presuppose that irony interpre-
tation is  perfectly achieved when an opposite meaning of the 
utterance is  comprehended. This view can  give a persuasive 
explanation to an  example of typical irony.
 (1) [To avoid hitting a woman and her cow in the middle 
    of the road, Stone's car runs into a fence.] 
     Stone: Oh, God. All right,  I'fn okay. All right. Oh, man, 
         my car, oh! The whole front end is shot! Am I
         glad you're here! (Doc Hollywood, Warner bros.) 
In the last part of (1) it seems plausible that Stone intends to 
communicate an  ironical meaning,  i. e, either I am not glad you 
were here, or I am sad you  were. here. However further investi-
gation on other types  of irony  will  show that the traditional 
view of irony is untenable. Consider examples (2) to (4) below.
(2) [After severely questioning a man, a sheriff threatens 
   the man to hang himself. Seeing the man's writhing in 
   being hung, the sheriff speaks following utterances very 
   slowly and dully.] 
 Help..  ,  Ben... Help... There's a man who is trying to
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     commit a suicide now in a jail... You've better hurry... 
                  (American Gothic, Renaissance Pictures)
(2) is a jocular case of irony. The  sheriffs utterance should be 
more tensed in such urgency, but his manner and the content 
of the utterance are totally different. This kind of gap gives 
rise to humorous effect on his behavior. Although (2) is ironi-
cal (and ludicrous), it is quite difficult to find out the opposite 
of its utterance which the sheriff intends to convey. In (2) 
what he most intends to express is his  jocular, ludicrous and 
even cruel  attitude to the state of affairs. This instance clearly 
shows that the researches based  on the traditional view of 
irony are insufficient since it is impossible to explain example 
(2) in an appropriate way. Utterances (3) and (4) are also 
problematic cases for the traditional view. 
 (3) [An overdosed patient leans over and  vomits. on Stone.] 
   Stone: Thanks. (Doc Hollywood.) 
 (4) Stone: Look, the high-profile, high-profit stuff just makes 
          it possible for us to do reconstructive surgery for 
          the needier patients. 
     Shulman:  Needier patients. You're a saint. You got an-
             other customer  over there.  (Doc Hollywood.) 
In these two examples, the speaker is being ironical by thank-
ing in (3) and by speaking metaphorically in (4).  In spite of 
their ironical effects, it is difficult to specify the opposite 
meaning of gratitude or metaphor. We can safely conclude 
from these instances that the studies based on the traditional 
view of irony can not appropriately explain  irony whose oppo-
site meaning can be hardly specified. 
 Following the traditional view of irony, we will overlook the 
important fact that the  purpose of using  ironical expressions is 
not to convey the opposite of the literal meaning but to show
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certain ironical attitudes. In this sense, irony is not a cognitive 
manner of communication but an affective manner of commu-
nication. 
 The next question, then, will be what kind of mechanism is 
concerned with the affective facet of irony. The answer will be 
posited in section 4. Before that, it is worth considering the na-
ture of irony here again. 
 Let us take a look at the nature of irony. First, when can an 
utterance be ironical and in what situation does it lose the 
 status? Some artificial instances will be useful for clarifying 
the questions. Consider several examples below in all of which 
we will deliberately ignore those special intonations as irony 
signal. 
 (5) [A and B are scholars who work for the same univer-
    sity. A knows that B thinks that A's laboratory is tidy.] 
    B: What an organized lab! 
 (6) [A and B are scholars who work for the same univer-
    sity. A knows that B thinks that A's laboratory is 
     messy.] 
    B: What an organized lab! 
 (7) [A and B are scholars who work for the same univer-
    sity. A doesn't know that B thinks that A's laboratory is 
    tidy.] 
    B: What an organized lab! 
 (8) [A and B are scholars who work for the same univer-
    sity. A doesn't know that B thinks that A's laboratory is 
     messy.] 
    B: What an organized lab! 
Among these examples, it is only in (6) that the hearer A can 
clearly interpret the utterance as irony. (5) is understood as a 
positive evaluation expressed  literally. (7) and (8) are subtler
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cases since all A can interpret is that B says what he thinks 
directly even if they happen to sound ironical to A. It seems 
reasonable from this observation to suppose that irony inter-
pretation is triggered by some kind of inconsistent gap be-
tween an assumption derived from the propositional content of 
the utterance and an assumption entertained  in the hearer's 
mind. Only in (6) the inconsistent  gap is recognized. This is 
the reason why the traditional view of irony, therefore any re-
search which depends on it, fails to capture the nature of 
irony. The intended opposite meaning should be treated as one 
part of triggering factor which has already existed in the in-
terpreter's mind but not the result of interpretation process. 
 The second significant property of irony is related to its 
function. It might be generally accepted that irony has two 
main functions: an evaluating  function, especially negative 
evaluation known as sarcasm, and  a humorous function. It is 
worth remarking here that the purpose of irony is to express 
and communicate these functions (but not to convey the  oppo-
site of the literal meaning of the utterance), and  that there 
must be some definite reason why the negative evaluation  and 
jocularity are the main functions of irony. Let us consider 
these points below. 
 When we are told ironically or when we speak ironically, 
what is the first interpretation or our intention of the ironical 
utterance? Intuitively, we will understand that the speaker in-
tends to blame, ridicule, make fun of or humorously entertain 
the hearer. Irony does provoke such kinds of feeling as anger, 
sadness or jocularity. This means that irony is not a rational 
way of speaking but an emotional one. It is safe to assume 
from these facts that irony directly influences the affective 
part of our mind. 
 To sum up, we will take a brief look at a jocular case of
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irony and  present two  features of irony which have been 
rather underestimated in the  literature.. 
 (9) [Mrs. Doubtfire walks up to the house and notices that 
     Stuart's Mercedes is parked  outside.] 
 Mrs. Doubtfire: Loverboy is here. What a beautiful little 
                  car for Don Juan. 
     [Mrs. Doubtfire moves to the front of the car and breaks 
    off the hood ornament.] 
     Mrs. Doubtfire: So sad when that happens. 
     (Mrs. Doubtfire, Twentieth Century Fox film corporation) 
In (9) Mrs. Doubtfire's utterance is  Irony.  It is apparent that 
she doesn't intend  to convey the opposite of the utterance 
since it is meaningless for her to say as a monologue the op-
posite utterance of what she has in mind. If we presume she 
intended to convey the opposite of  the utterance, it gets ob-
scure  why she deliberately speaks in  that way despite that she 
knows what  she  really wants to express. What she intends to 
communicate (to herself) is an inconsistent relation between 
 an  existing assumption  inferred from her behavior and an as-
sumption derived from the utterance. From her behavior to 
break the ornament, there exist in the speaker's mind inferred 
assumptions; for example, that she  has  a distinct intention  to 
do it,  that' she may dislike the car's owner, and that she may 
be happy to  break it. Into this context is an inconsistent  as-
sumption introduced  by her utterance, and  then  an inconsis-
tent relation between the two assumptions emerges into our 
mind. This kind of gap, as a result, leads to a humorous effect, 
that is, jocularity  or ridiculousness in her behavior. 
 Let us now summarize the nature of irony. 
 (10) a. Irony comes out from the inconsistent gap between 
       two assumptions.
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    b. The purpose for using irony is to appeal to such affec-
      tive facets of communication as negative evaluation, 
      ridicule or jocularity. 
 3.. Humor 
In this section we will take a close  look at humorous examples 
and explore the nature of jocularity in humor. Consider two 
examples below by turns. Let  us call an utterance which gives 
us a cue for humor interpretation a "trigger utterance" for con-
venience. 
(11) First Child? 
      A man spoke frantically into the phone, "My wife is 
     pregnant and  her contractions are only two minutes
     apart!" 
    "Is this her first child?" the doctor asked. 
     "No
, you idiot!" the man shouted. "This is her husband!" 
                         (Cited from  Oraclehumor.corn) 
In  (11), where does its jocularity come from? What makes (11) 
humorous?' Under what condition are we unable to understand 
its jocosity? Whether (11)  is understood to  be humorous is 
completely dependent on  whether  its trigger  utterance This is 
her husband! can be comprehended. From the previous linguis-
tic context, especially the man's reply No, you idiot!, his next 
utterance can be expected to be something like Her second 
child or  Her fifth child. But his words as a  trigger utterance do 
not meet our expectations. In  order to  understand the trigger 
utterance, we  have• to proceed further inference and find that 
there are a cluster of assumptions  with  which the trigger ut-
terance can make sense. In (11), for example, we can recognize 
two sets of assumption clusters shown below. 
(12) Assumptions derived from the previous discourse
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    a. The man calls a doctor to know what to do for his 
       wife's labor. 
    b. The doctor asks whether it is her first child in order 
      to find the best way. 
     c. [From the man's reply, following assumptions are  pre-
      dicted.] The man's answer would be: "Her second 
      child," or "Her fifth child." 
 (13) Newly inferred assumptions from the trigger utterance 
     a. The man's utterance does not make sense as an an-
      swer to the doctor's question. (But it is obvious that
      he does not speak meaninglessly.) 
    b. If he misunderstoodthe doctor's speech style "Is this 
      her first child?" as such an formulaic utterance as "Is 
      this her first child speaking?", his angry reply com-
       pletely make sense. 
     c. Therefore he must misunderstand the doctor's utter-
         ance. 
It is this duality of two assumption clusters which makes ut-
terance (11) humorous. Without recognizing the new assump-
tion cluster (13) and, therefore, without recognizing the 
duality, we can not understand the jocularity in (11). It 
should be noted here that those inconsistent assumption clus-
ters are linked together by the trigger utterance. From a cog-
nitive perspective, it can be safely restated that two 
inconsistent sets of assumptions, which are introduced into our 
mind, provoke humorousness. In this respect, humor has in 
common with irony since irony is also interpreted from the in-
consistent relation between two particular assumptions. 
 Example (14) can be explained in the same way. 
 (14) Nobel Prize 
      A man is driving down a country road, when he spots 
     a farmer standing in the  middle of a huge field of grass.
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    He pulls the car over to the side of the road and notices 
     that the  farmer is just standing there, doing nothing, 
    looking at nothing. 
      The man gets out of  the  car, walks all  the. way out to 
     the farmer and asks him, "Ah excuse me mister, but
    what are  you doing?" 
      The farmer replies, "I'm trying to win a Nobel Prize." 
       "How?"  asks the 
man, puzzled. 
      "Well
, I heard they give  the Nobel Prize  ... to people 
    who are out standing  in their field." 
                         (Cited  from Oraclehumor.  com) 
This sort  of humor pun is greatly dependent on the 
polysemous feature of linguistic elements. The same factor 
seen in  (11) works here, although the  .trigger utterance Well, I 
heard they give  the. Nobel  Prize  .  .  . to people who are out standing 
 in their field is  different from that in  (11) in that its 
 polysemous property is the  crucial key for interpretation proc-
ess. 
 Several  assumptions, in (15) are first introduced from a pre-
vious linguistic context. Into this state of the  interpreter's 
mind is the newly inferred cluster of assumptions (16) intro-
duced in order to understand the trigger utterance. 
(15) a. A farmer is standing in the middle of a huge field of 
        grass. 
    b.The driver asks the farmer what he is doing there. 
    c. The farmer replies that he is trying to  win a Nobel 
       Prize. 
    d.He might observe the meteorological changes by feel-
      ing temperature, humidity or wind with his body in 
      order to propose a perfect theory of weather forecast.
    e. By praying devoutly, he might try to realize a perfect
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      peace on this  world. 
    f. This might be the best way for him to resolve a 
      mathematical formula which has never been proved.
 (16)' a. If the farmer misunderstands the phonological strings 
      and meaning of the word "outstanding"  'to be those of 
      the words "out standing," and if he also misunder-
      stands the meaning of the word "field",  that is, 
      speciality, to be the meaning as agricultural land, then
 his utterance is consistent with his act. 
    b. The farmer is indeed standing in  'the middle of a huge 
      field of grass. 
     c. Therefore he must misunderstand (or, at least, he pre-
      tends to misunderstand intentionally). 
After achieving  this' series of further inference, we can make 
sense of the farmer's seemingly inappropriate utterance. It is 
worth remarking here that our interpretation of (14) is com-
pletely  fulfilled' not only when his odd utterance is rationally 
comprehended but also when its jocularity is emotionally 
 emerged;  And, in the same way as  (11), the jocularity of (14) 
is derived  frond the inconsistent relation of two assumption 
 clusters. 
 From the two  instances of humor, the nature of humor can 
be concluded as follows. 
 (17) a. Humor is comprehended when two clusters  'of assump-
       tions are recognized simultaneously. 
     b. The inconsistent relation between  two assumption 
      clusters provokes a certain kind of affective process, 
 i.e., jocularity. 
Humor can be called an affective manner of communication 
through a characteristic cognitive process.
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4. The state of cognitive  discordance: A common feature  of 
irony and  humor 
The previous two sections showed that irony and humor have 
two common properties. Let  us restate here their  common 
properties as a beginning of this section. It can be summarized 
that their common features are the following two respects; (i) 
the first step of the comprehension is to perceive an inconsis-
tent relation between two (clusters of) assumptions, and (ii) 
the inconsistent relation provokes affective facets of interpreta-
tion. In this section, I will present a new analysis based on 
Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson (1986, 1995)) in order 
to  capture  the two properties described above. 
4. 1. Communication and cognitive effects 
Before discussing  a new analysis, it is useful to examine from 
a Relevance-theoretic  perspective  how  our verbal communica-
tion is performed. In the framework of Relevance Theory, our 
communication is treated as an  ostensive-inferential  communi-
cation. In other  words, a speaker  intends to convey  a certain 
information which is presumably worth  paying, attention for a 
hearer, and the hearer  expects the presumption that the infor-
mation  is worth interpreting and begins  to understand the 
speaker's utterance. To put it cognitively, the speaker  commu-
nicates and  the hearer  interprets, on the  presumption, that the 
 speaker's utterance is profitable for constructing  the hearer's 
cognitive environment, so called, the system of belief. What  is 
important here  is whether the speaker's utterance gives a prof-
itable modification to  the hearer's cognitive environment. How 
is, then, the cognitive environment modified profitably? 
 Relevance Theory gives a clear explanation to this question 
in terms of  three cognitive effects (which are also called 'con-
textual effects'). In the present study, however, one of the
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effects contextual  implication will be deliberately ignored since 
it is not important for the discussion here. Let  'us take a brief 
look at the other two cognitive effects which are related to the 
confirmation value  assigned to each and every assumption in 
the cognitive environment.' 
 (18) Contextual effects 
    a. Contradiction leading to  abandonment  of existing  as-
      sumptions :  {C  :  n} +  IP  :  ,  (P. C, n  <  m)—>  {P:m} 
 {C1 : n} : [Mary said to me  that] John did  not believe 
              in UFO's. 
 {P1  :  m} : [I saw John deliver a speech in a UFO club 
             meeting.] John must believe in UFO's.  
      {P1' :  m} :  John  believes, in UFO's. 
    b.  Strengthening  :  {C  :  n} +  {P  : {C  :  n+m} 
 {C2  : : Extraterrestrials exist. 
 {P2  :  10} : A UFO landed just in front of me yesterday. 
      {C2 :  n  +10}  :Extraterrestrials exist. 
Contradiction leading to abandonment of existing assumptions 
is as follows when there are  two contradicting assumptions, 
which have different confirmation values, in a cognitive  envi-
ronment, the one which is weakly confirmed is abandoned. In 
(18a), for example,  {C1 : contradicts  {P1 :  rn},,  and the weakly 
confirmed  :  n} is abandoned since  {P1  : obtained through 
a direct experience is much stronger than {C1 :  n} gained from 
other's story. 
 Strengthening is as follows when  there are two complement-
ing  assumptions in a cognitive environment, the confirmation 
value of the existing assumption is strengthened by the other 
newly introduced one. In  (18b) the existing  assumption  {C2 :  n} 
and the new assumption  {P2  :  10} complement each other and 
then the confirmation value of {C2 :  n} is strengthened to be
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 {C2  :  n+  10}. 
4. 2. Cognitive discordance 
Based  upon- the cognitive effects which are ordinary cognitive 
processes in constructing the cognitive environment, there can 
be found  a different  facet of the cognitive effects, which 
should be called "(the state  of) cognitive discordance." As is 
shown  in Haruki (2000), two types of cognitive discordance 
can be posited as bellow. 
(19) Cognitive discordance means two extraordinary states of 
 cognitive' environment; 
     a. Discordance by contradiction: Two contradicting as-
      sumptions, {C} and  IP), exist in a cognitive environ-
      ment at the same time, and 
     b. Discordance by strengthening: Two complementing as-
      sumptions,  {C} and  {P}  , exist in a cognitive  environ-
      ment without being strengthened, 
From the cognitive discordance perspective, it follows that: (i) 
the state of cognitive discordance means some sort of unsta-
bleness of the cognitive environment, and (ii) the unstableness 
can lead us directly to certain affective responses  such as 
rather negative emotion, on one hand, and jocularity, on the 
other. We can now easily expect that the cognitive discor-
dance can give a  persuasive explanation for two properties 
which reside in irony and  humor.' We will concentrate on the 
first cognitive discordance, discordance by contradiction  (19a), 
here since it is associated with irony and  humor.' 
 In the case of irony like (1), a  certain assumption inferred 
from the previous car accident context is entertained in the 
cognitive environment, into which an assumption derived from 
Stone's utterance is introduced. The state of discordance by
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contradiction like (20) is now brought about in the cognitive 
environment, and this unstableness of mind provokes rather 
negative motion. 
 (20) a. [An assumption  i ferred from the previous car acci-
      dent context] 
     STONEIS IN AN UNPLEASANT MOOD (SINCE HE 
     THINKS THE ACCIDENT TOOK PLACE  BECAUSE 
     THE WOMAN AND HER COW STOOD IN THE 
     MIDDLE OF THE ROAD) 
     b. [An assumptionderived from stone's utterance] 
     STONE IS VERY GLAD THAT SHE AND HER COW 
     WAS  :IN THE MIDDLE OF THE ROAD 
 The case of humor can be explained in the same way. In ex-
ample  (11), from the previous linguistic ontext, a certain as-
sumption cluster exists in the cognitive environment. When 
the trigger utterance of the young man is comprehended in a 
different way, a newly derived assumption cluster is enter-
tained in the cognitive nvironment. The two assumption clus-
ters  •introduce the state of cognitive discordance, and then 
provokes an affective state of mind, jocularity. In (14)  the.  two 
assumption clusters, repeated here as (21) and (22), cause the 
state of cognitive discordance, which provokes jocosity. 
 (21) An assumption cluster derived from the previous  dis- ' 
course: (a) A FARMER IS STANDING IN THE MIDDLE 
    OF A HUGE FIELD OF GRASS / (b) THE DRIVER 
    ASKS THE FARMER WHAT  HE  IS DOING  THERE  /(c) 
    THE FARMER REPLIES THAT HE IS TRYING TO WIN 
 A NOBEL PRIZE / (d) HE MIGHT OBSERVE THE 
   METEOROLOGICAL CHANGES BY FEELING 
    TEMPERATURE, HUMIDITY OR WIND WITH HIS 
    BODY IN ORDER TO  PROPOSE. A PERFECT THEORY
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   OF WEATHER FORECAST / (e) BY PRAYING 
   DEVOUTLY, HE MIGHT TRY TO REALIZE A 
    PERFECT PEACE ON THIS WORLD  1(0 THIS MIGHT 
   BE THE BEST WAY FOR HIM TO RESOLVE A 
   MATHEMATICAL FORMULA WHICH HAS NEVER 
   BEEN PROVED 
(22) An assumption cluster inferred from the trigger utter-
    ance: (a) IF THE FARMER MISUNDERSTANDS THE 
    MEANING (AND PHONOLOGICAL STRINGS) OF THE 
    WORD "OUTSTANDING" TO BE THOSE OF THE 
    WORDS "OUT /  STANDING",. AND IF HE ALSO 
    MISUNDERSTANDS THE  MEANING. OF THE WORD 
    "FIELD"
, THAT IS, SPECIALITY, TO BE THE MEANING 
    "AGRICULTURAL LAND"
, THEN HIS UTTERANCE IS 
    CONSISTENT WITH HIS ACT / (b) THE FARMER IS
    INDEED STANDING IN THE MIDDLE OF A HUGE
    FIELD OF GRASS / (c) THEREFORE HE MUST 
 MISUNDERSTAND  (OR, AT LEAST, HE  PRETENDS  TO 
    MISUNDERSTAND INTENTIONALLY) 
 The analysis presented here can explain the nature of irony 
and humor more effectively in the following two respects. 
 (I) It can capture the true nature of irony and humor. It 
    can treat the inconsistent gap seen in both of them as
     the state of cognitive discordance. 
 (II) It can give a clear answer to the question why such 
    types of affection as negative evaluation and jocularity 
     are prominent in irony and humor. The unstableness 
    shown in the state of cognitive discordance links up  di-
    rectly with rather a negative affection or jocularity.
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 5. Concluding remarks 
In this article, it has been demonstrated that the cognitive dis-
cordance plays a central role  in capturing the nature of irony 
and humor. Both of them are not a cognitive manner of com-
munication but an affective manner of communication. The 
present analysis is preferable for understanding the character-
istics since it can treat their affective facet in a direct way. I 
must admit, however, that this study is still at a preliminary 
stage, and that, for lack of space, I ignored the detailed argu-
ment about other researches on irony and humor. Full explora-
tion of this issue would require further accumulation of 
studies. I will leave it to future research. 
                     NOTES 
1  For detailed discussion of cognitive effects, see Sperber and Wilson (1986, 
 1995: chapter  2). 
2 It is worth remarking that the term "contradiction"  is used loosely here to 
   refer to every kind of opposition. 
3 It should be noted that the second discordance by strengthening is also 
   useful, especially when we examine such rhetorical expressions as parody 
   and pure echoic irony. 
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